Depression diagnoses, but not individual differences in depression symptoms, are associated with reduced autobiographical memory specificity.

OBJECTIVES: Difficulties recalling specific events from one's autobiographical past have been associated with a range of emotional disorders. We present the first examination of whether diagnoses of depression or individual differences in depression severity explain the most variance in autobiographical memory specificity. We also examine the contribution of other key cognitive factors associated with reduced memory specificity - rumination and verbal fluency - to these effects. METHODS: Participants with (n = 21) and without (n = 25) major depressive disorder completed self-report measures of depression severity (Beck Depression Inventory version II; BDI-II) and ruminative tendency (Ruminative Response Scale), a measure of verbal fluency, and the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) to assess memory specificity. RESULTS: People diagnosed with depression recalled significantly fewer specific memories in the AMT relative to healthy controls. In a linear regression, diagnostic status explained a significant amount of unique variance in specificity whereas BDI-II scores did not. Diagnostic group differences in verbal fluency also explained a significant amount of variance in specificity. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings extend our understanding of the mechanisms involved in reduced memory specificity but future research must explore the causal contribution of weak executive functioning to reduced memory specificity. PRACTITIONERS POINTS: Diagnoses of depression were associated with problems recalling specific events from one's past. Problems with memory specificity amongst depressed people were associated with executive functioning difficulties. Problems with specificity were not associated with individual differences in depression severity or ruminative tendencies.

Emotion and false memory: How goal-irrelevance can be relevant for what people remember.

Elaborating on misleading information concerning emotional events can lead people to form false memories. The present experiment compared participants' susceptibility to false memories when they elaborated on information associated with positive versus negative emotion and pregoal versus postgoal emotion. Pregoal emotion reflects appraisals that goal attainment or failure is anticipated but has not yet occurred (e.g., hope and fear). Postgoal emotion reflects appraisals that goal attainment or failure has already occurred (e.g., happiness and devastation). Participants watched a slideshow depicting an interaction between a couple and were asked to empathise with the protagonist's feelings of hope (positive pregoal), happiness (positive postgoal), fear (negative pregoal), or devastation (negative postgoal); in control conditions, no emotion was mentioned. Participants were then asked to reflect on details of the interaction that had occurred (true) or had not occurred (false), and that were relevant or irrelevant to the protagonist's goal. Irrespective of emotional valence, participants in the pregoal conditions were more susceptible to false memories concerning goal-irrelevant details than were participants in the other conditions. These findings support the view that pregoal emotions narrow attention to information relevant to goal pursuit, increasing susceptibility to false memories for irrelevant information.

The power of emotion versus the power of suggestion: memory for emotional events in the misinformation paradigm.

Research has shown that emotional events are remembered better than neutral events, but might also elicit an increase in false memories. The present study was designed to disentangle the influences of valence and arousal on event memory in the misinformation paradigm. Participants were shown six types of photographs (positive with high/low arousal, negative with high/low arousal, ambiguous, neutral), after which half of them were exposed to misleading information. A recognition test assessed memory for both correct and false central and peripheral details. Negative and ambiguous events elicited fewer correct and more false memories for peripheral details than positive and neutral events, regardless of previous exposure to misinformation. Arousal improved memory for correct central details, and both negative valence and arousal inhibited control participants' tendency to endorse false central details. The power of emotion was overruled by the power of suggestion, however, as the latter effect disappeared with previous exposure to misinformation. Results are discussed in the light of earlier research on emotion and cognition, recent motivational theories, and implications for forensic practice.

Mood and the DRM paradigm: An investigation of the effects of valence and arousal on false memory.

Recent studies regarding the effect of mood on the DRM (Deese-Roediger-McDermott) illusion have not been able to clearly establish yet whether valence or arousal is most critical in determining susceptibility to false memories, nor what the underlying processes are. In three experiments, both the valence and the level of arousal of participants' mood were manipulated. Six conditions were used: positive mood with high/low arousal, negative mood with high/low arousal, neutral mood, and a control condition. Memory was tested by means of immediate and delayed recognition and immediate free recall. The mood induction procedure was effective. For recognition memory, there was an effect of arousal on the endorsement of critical lures. Low-arousal moods elicited more false recognition than high-arousal moods, regardless of valence. Based on signal detection analyses, the effect was attributed to more liberal response criteria with low arousal, in combination with a tendency towards improved item-specific memory with high arousal.

Motivation matters: differing effects of pre-goal and post-goal emotions on attention and memory.

People often show enhanced memory for information that is central to emotional events and impaired memory for peripheral details. The intensity of arousal elicited by an emotional event is commonly held to be the mechanism underlying memory narrowing, with the implication that all sources of emotional arousal should have comparable effects. Discrete emotions differ in their effects on memory, however, with some emotions broadening rather than narrowing the range of information attended to and remembered. Thus, features of emotion other than arousal appear to play a critical role in memory narrowing. We review theory and research on emotional memory narrowing and argue that motivation matters. Recent evidence suggests that emotions experienced prior to goal attainment or loss lead to memory narrowing whereas emotions experienced after goal attainment or loss broaden the range of information encoded in memory. The motivational component of emotion is an important but understudied feature that can help to clarify the conditions under which emotions enhance and impair attention and memory.

The effect of articulatory suppression on implicit and explicit false memory in the DRM paradigm.

Several studies have shown that reliable implicit false memory can be obtained in the DRM paradigm. There has been considerable debate, however, about whether or not conscious activation of critical lures during study is a necessary condition for this. Recent findings have revealed that articulatory suppression prevents subsequent false priming in an anagram task (Lovden & Johansson, 2003). The present experiment sought to replicate and extend these findings to an implicit word stem completion task, and to additionally investigate the effect of articulatory suppression on explicit false memory. Results showed an inhibitory effect of articulatory suppression on veridical memory, as well as on implicit false memory, whereas the level of explicit false memory was heightened. This suggests that articulatory suppression did not merely eliminate conscious lure activation, but had a more general capacity-delimiting effect. The drop in veridical memory can be attributed to diminished encoding of item-specific information. Superficial encoding also limited the spreading of semantic activation during study, which inhibited later false priming. In addition, the lack of item-specific and phenomenological details caused impaired source monitoring at test, resulting in heightened explicit false memory.

Incidental versus intentional encoding in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm: does amnesic patients' implicit false memory depend on conscious activation of the lure?

In two experiments, implicit false memory was investigated in Korsakoff patients and controls following incidental and intentional encoding in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Participants were asked to think aloud, to investigate whether conscious lure activation occurs equally often in both groups under both types of instructions, and whether this influences the likelihood of later false memory. Results revealed normal priming for critical lures in amnesia following both types of encoding. Korsakoff patients did verbalize fewer lures than did controls during intentional encoding and showed impaired recognition performance. Lure verbalization was shown to contribute to explicit false memory, but had no clear effect on implicit memory. Together, results point to the conclusion that amnesic patients' encoding abilities are sufficient to obtain normal priming for critical lure words, and that conscious lure activation during study is not required to do so.

Confabulation versus experimentally induced false memories in Korsakoff patients.

The present study focuses on both the clinical symptom of confabulation and experimentally induced false memories in patients suffering from Korsakoff's syndrome. Despite the vast amount of case studies of confabulating patients and studies investigating false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, the nature of Korsakoff patients' confabulatory behaviour and its association with DRM false memories have been rarely examined. Hence, the first aim of the present study was to evaluate confabulatory responses in a large sample of chronic Korsakoff patients and matched controls by means of the Dalla Barba Confabulation Battery. Second, the association between (provoked) confabulation and the patients' DRM false recognition performance was investigated. Korsakoff patients mainly confabulated in response to questions about episodic memory and questions to which the answer was unknown. A positive association was obtained between confabulation and the tendency to accept unstudied distractor words as being old in the DRM paradigm. On the other hand, there was a negative association between confabulation and false recognition of critical lures. The latter could be attributed to the importance of strategic retrieval at delayed memory testing.

Implicit false memory in the DRM paradigm: effects of amnesia, encoding instructions, and encoding duration.

Recent studies with the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (Deese 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) paradigm have revealed that amnesic patients do not only show impaired veridical memory, but also diminished false memory for semantically related lure words. Due to the typically used explicit retrieval instructions, however, this finding may reflect problems at encoding, at recollection, or both. Therefore, the present experiments examined implicit as well as explicit false memory in patients suffering from Korsakoff's syndrome and controls. In Experiment 1, encoding instructions either focused on remembering individual list words, or on discovering semantic relationships among the words. In Experiment 2, different presentation durations were used. Results emphasize the distinction between automatic and intentional retrieval: Korsakoff patients' veridical and false memory scores were diminished when explicit recollection was required, but not when memory was tested implicitly. Encoding manipulations only significantly affected veridical memory: Priming was reduced with thematic encoding, and explicit retrieval was facilitated when given more study time.

Memory loss versus memory distortion: the role of encoding and retrieval deficits in Korsakoff patients' false memories.

Recent studies with the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm have revealed that Korsakoff patients show reduced levels of false recognition and different patterns of false recall compared to controls. The present experiment examined whether this could be attributed to an encoding deficit, or rather to problems with explicitly retrieving thematic information at test. In a variation on the DRM paradigm, both patients and controls were presented with associative as well as categorised word lists, with the order of recall and recognition tests manipulated between-subjects. The results point to an important role for the automatic/controlled retrieval distinction: Korsakoff patients' false memory was only diminished compared to controls' when automatic or short-term memory processes could not be used to fulfil the task at hand. Hence, the patients' explicit retrieval deficit appears to be crucial in explaining past and present data. Results are discussed in terms of fuzzy-trace and activation-monitoring theories.

Elaborative processing in the Korsakoff syndrome: context versus habit.

Using a procedure of Hay and Jacoby [Hay, J. F., & Jacoby, L. L. (1999). Separating habit and recollection in young and older adults: Effects of elaborative processing and distinctiveness. Psychology and Aging, 14, 122-134], Korsakoff patients' capacity to encode and retrieve elaborative, semantic information was investigated. Habits were created during initial training, whereupon cued-recall memory performance was examined, with habit opposing as well as facilitating recollection of earlier studied words. A first group of patients was instructed and tested in the same way as healthy controls and showed poor test performance. Nevertheless, when given more processing and response time, additional explanation, and explicit encouragement, a second group of patients performed similarly to healthy controls. The results suggest that, when given adequate support, Korsakoff patients are able to encode and make use of semantic, contextual, and sequential information. Word distinctiveness, however, only influenced performance of controls.

Memory and the Korsakoff syndrome: not remembering what is remembered.

Following the distinction between involuntary unconscious memory, involuntary conscious memory, and intentional retrieval, the focus of the present paper is whether there is an impairment of involuntary conscious memory among Korsakoff patients. At study, participants generated associations versus counted the number of letters with enclosed spaces or the number of vowels in the target words (semantic versus perceptual processing). In the Direct tests, stems were to be used to retrieve the targets with either guessing or no guessing allowed; in the Opposition tests, the stems were to be completed with the first word that came to mind but using another word if that first word was a target word; and in the Indirect tests, no reference was made to the target words from the study phase. In the Direct tests, the performance of Korsakoff patients was not necessarily worse than the one of healthy controls, provided guessing was allowed. More critical for the Korsakoff patients was the deficient involuntary conscious memory. The deficiency explained the suppression failures in the Opposition tests, the absence of performance differences between the Indirect and Opposition tests, the absence of a beneficial effect in providing information about the status of the stem, the performance boost when allowed to guess, and the very low rate of "Know"/"Remember" responses.